Octane Render 2 4 Cracked [VERIFIED]
So, the problem always occurs when the GPU no. 2 is active separately or combined with any other GPU.But if we render in Octane or Vray, they seem to be working just fine.Furthermore, the error occured after about a month and not a thing has been changed. Before, everything worked perfectly fine.The error remains even after complete re-installing of the Windows and and the update of the BIOS.
octane render 2 4 cracked
But what bothers us the most, is that other rendering softwares that we use have no problem with this connection scheme so far. Do you think there may be any possible option that we might have missed that could be connected with this problem and could fix it?
Do you have "Distribute Memory Across Devices" enabled in the Cycles render devices preferences by any chance? This option only works in a very limited GPU connection configuration, so it could be the cause. If yes, can you retest with it disabled?
1.2. According to decision G 4/92 (OJ EPO 1994, 149) of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, a decision should not be made against a party failing to attend oral proceedings if such a decision would be based on new facts first submitted at those oral proceedings. Being based on Claim 1 as granted, the amendments to Claim 1 made in the present case by the Respondents during the oral proceedings in the elected absence of the Appellant are not new facts within the meaning of G 4/92. Moreover, the amendments are all intended to overcome deficiencies under Article 123(3) EPC, a ground of appeal which had been raised by the Appellant in its statement of grounds of appeal. Consequently, the Appellant had to expect that the Respondents would try to overcome this objection by suitable amendments (see also T 133/92, not published in the OJ EPO, reasons for the decision No. 7). Therefore, the Appellant's right to be heard was not violated by rendering this decision in the Appellant's absence.
3. The Board holds, therefore, that the cited prior art documents either alone or in combination do not render obvious the claimed solution of the present technical problem, and concludes that the process of Claim 1 is based on an inventive step within the meaning of Article 56 EPC.
*2 In response to the show cause order, Chester did not request that a final hearing be set; nor did Chester file a motion requesting a testimony period. Rather, Chester's response (Paper No. 54) requested reconsideration of the EIC's determinations and submitted that judgment should not be rendered against him for the good causes designated as I-IV. As set forth in Commissioner's Notice of December 23, 1981, Interference Practice: Response to Order to Show Cause Under 37 CFR 1.640, 1074 O.G. 4, where the response does not request a final hearing but instead contains a full discussion of the reasons why judgment should not be entered:
Chester's "good cause I" is not responsive to the order to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against Chester. The order to show cause was based on the decisions of the EIC which held that Chester's claims corresponding to the count were unpatentable to Chester. Chester's "good cause I" does not address the basis of the order to show cause and therefore presents no reason why judgment should not be entered in accordance with the order.
Chester's request for reconsideration of the decision denying Chester's motion for judgment against Miller is plainly not a response to the order to show cause pursuant to 37 CFR 1.640(e), but rather is a request for reconsideration of a decision on a motion "which does not result in the issuance of an order to show cause." 37 CFR 1.640(c). The denial of Chester's motion for judgment did not result in the issuance of an order to show cause. Requests for reconsideration of motions which do not result in the issuance of an order to show cause are governed by 37 CFR 1.640(c), which also provides that such requests for reconsideration may be filed "within 14 days after the date of the decision" and shall specify with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in rendering the decision. The request for reconsideration of the denial of Chester's motion is untimely because it was not filed within the 14 day period specified by 37 CFR 1.640(c). Since Chester filed no motion pursuant to 37 CFR 1.645(b) and 1.635 to show sufficient cause why the request for reconsideration was not timely filed, it will not be considered. 37 CFR 1.645(b). The Board has no authority to waive express requirements of the rules.
Chester urges that, even though the examiner held that there was a disclaimer in both lines of Chester's parent applications, there was a "retreat by the PTO of its 'disclaimer' positions" due to the issuance of patents in the earlier applications. It is Chester's position that since the patents were allowed, Chester had no standing to appeal or petition the holdings of disclaimer. We disagree with Chester's arguments. There was no retreat from the clear and unequivocal holdings of disclaimer by the examiner. The allowance of claims was based on the additional limitations in the claims which rendered those claims patentably distinct from the subject matter disclaimed. The examiner's holding that the claims allowed in application Serial No. 430,198 were patentably distinct from the subject matter disclaimed was upheld on petition (Paper No. 19). Accordingly, there was no "retreat" from the holding of disclaimer in our view. Moreover, we disagree with Chester's present contention that he could not have petitioned the examiner's holding of disclaimer, and sought review of any adverse decision on petition, if he disagreed with the holding of disclaimer. Rather, as noted by Miller, there is no indication in the records of the parent cases that Chester "even disagreed with the disclaimer holdings, much less would have wanted review of them."
*5 In Chester's response designated as good cause III, Chester requests reconsideration of the decision of the EIC that Chester claims 17-28 are unpatentable over US Patent No. 3,758,403 (403) under 35 USC 102 or 103. Chester contends that neither Miller nor the EIC has established that (403) provides "written description" and "enablement" of the subject matter of the rejected claims. In particular, Chester quotes a limitation of claim 17 "a silica to alumina mole ratio of at least 12 and wherein ... sufficient to effect octane number increase and total yield improvement" and urges that neither Miller nor the EIC has established that the reference provides written description and enablement for the quoted subject matter.